Post-conflict peacebuilding in Afghanistan

AfghanistanThe aim of the following essay will be to evaluate the encounter which the ISAF and peace-keeping efforts by the United Nations have had on the peacebuilding border in Afghanistan, following the US array intervention in outgrowth Enduring Freedom. Following two Anglo-Afghan struggles, Afghanistan gained independence in 1919 and joined the compact of Nations. Its example was followed by opposite farming of matters which gained independence from imperial domination and governance, which following the establishment of the United Nations emergenceed in the shaping of the contemporary geo- governmental order (Rubin, 2006). Afghanistan was build by the co-ordination of flows of foreign aid and when the aid flows were directed to fightds the sponsoring of opposing army forces, a cultured war erupted, eventually leading to the stop of the state as the flows of foreign aid were stopped (Rubin, 2002). For most of its known report, Afghanistan remained a heterogeneous and tribal state having multiple and contrasting legal, cultural and political systems (Dupree, 2002 Simonsen, 2004). When the Soviet Union withdrew in Afghanistan in 1989, the Taliban gained supremacy in spite of appearance the state and the lack of consensus lead to the eruption of a civil war (Matinuddin, 1999). The compass point of 1992-1994 in Afghanistan was one of chaos and civil war, as the opposition factions failed to figure out an effective coalition government, thus leading to a civil war (Coll, 2004 Maley, 2009). In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the US and a Coalition of other states to initiate a war on terror, a result of the Talibans refusal to cooperate in the apprehension of Al Qaedas leader Bin Laden (Rubin, 2013). Following the re-capturing of the capital by the allied forces and the dispersal of the Taliban, the foundations of Afghanistans re-structuring were set out in the UN Bonn Agreement (UN, 2001). In summary, it set out the path for a transition towards a western-style ingrained democracy with significant emphasis being limitd on military man rights, social justice and gender equality (Nesiah, 2004).ISAF delegating Following consummation Enduring Freedom and the liberation of the capital capital of Afghanistan, the UN Security council passed Re resultant role 1386 with which it mould the foundations of the ISAF, which was deployed initially in Kabul. The ISAF was set to operate in close cooperation with the both(prenominal) the UN and the Afghan government whilst working the unpolisheds reconstructive memory and the phylogeny of its shelter personnel (ISAF, 2014). Its delineate participation in the reconstruction crop was manifested by the establishment of Provisional Reconstruction Teams in provinces in the northerly and western parts of the country (ibid.) Initially, ISAFs decree was constrained to providing warrantor in the capital city, exactly following the UN Resolution 1510 in 2003, its enactment was expanded so as to provide aegis department throughout the countrys territory (ISAF, 2014a). The world-wide Security Assistance Force is delegate of all NATO member state countries and over the years has been broadened so as to include troops from non-member states such as Australia and New Zealand (ISAF, 2014b). The activities of the ISAF and its military commission physical object can considered in line with strategies utilised for state-building and peace-making (Rose-Ackerman, 2001). During its mandate from 2001 onwards, the ISAF has been established as the main provider of national security deep down the country, whilst at the resembling time rearing the newly formed Afghan National regular army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) (ISAF, 2014). In addition to providing security on a national scale, the ISAF has been actively involved in the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of rapscallion militants, thus enabling the state to son g monopoly over violence (NATO, 2013). Until the final result of its mandate at the end of 2014, the ISAF will continue to help the transitional state to train its own security forces as part of supranational efforts to ensure stability within the country and ensure that a calm transition from the civil war onto a more democratic nerve tract of governance is achieved.Evaluating ISAFDefining both success and failure in peacekeeping operation missions is a difficult task due to lack of consensus with regards to their definition (Druckman et al. 1997 Bellamy and Williams, 2005). It has to a fault been suggested that peacekeeping is more likely to succeed in more true states and in countries where the death toll is minimal (Fortna, 2004). If one is to use the last mentioned framework, then all efforts in Afghanistan are likely to be in vain. More recent research has identified six factors which appear to be of significant relevance the successful deployment of available resource s, overlap of interest among key stakeholders, emphasis on continuous conflict regulation, external cooperation as well up as recognising the specific environment in which the conflict has taken place (Wolff and Dursun-Ozkanca, 2012). In the expression of Afghanistan however, the US-led invasion had no clear strategies for a state-building carry out (Ayub and Kouvo, 2008). As a result, the initial focus on the war on terror lacked a clear direction at it failed to provide a clear division between short-term goals of pacifying the terrorist threat and the longer-term peace-building lick within the country (ibid). The invasion of Afghanistan was not about promoting security bur sooner reducing the spreading sense of insecurity in the US (Nesiah, 2004).The state-building process that followed had no clear goals and was characterised by competing paradigms, as well as antagonistic agendas (Weinberger, 2002 Rubin, 2006 Suhrke, 2012). It can be argued that the Taliban resurgence in 2 005 and consequent lack of security in the country precluded any substantial democratisation effort. However, this ignores the causal family between the two failure of the political process, and an incoherent US/NATO military strategy, which provided the vacuum and space necessary for the Taliban and other counter-systemic actors to establish and expand their capture in the country (Suhrke, 2008). Linked to the incoherent military strategy is the expressage impact of the DDR process that was to strengthen the position of the ISAF (Reynolds, 2006 Saikal, 2012). The expansion of ISAF outside of Kabul also played a significant part in the escalation of the conflict (Suhrke, 2011). The escalating war ratcheted up the demand for rapid and visible results, both within Afghanistan and from domestic audiences in the contributing countries. To deliver quick and visible results, the interveners follow measures that undermined basic precepts of state-building and by extension its contribut ion to peacebuilding. In order to promptly pull in Afghan military capacity, for example, the worldwide forces started rearming the militias (Lefevre, 2010). A large sum of resources were diverted towards training the ANA, whereas the lack of training for the ANP produced problems for the ISAF, mainly in term of corruption and human rights abuses (Beljan, 2013). The establishment of PRTs throughout the country was seen as the solution for providing security and reconstruction at the same time (ibid.). However, their activity was characterised by lack of clear objectives, lack of a clear commanding bodily structure and lack of resources (Sedra, 2005). This lack of coherence is not only characteristic of the PRTs themselves, but rather to the lack of a clear strategy for the operation of ISAF (Sperling and Webber, 2012), as the establishment of security needs to run parallel to economic development as part of restructuring efforts. As it was noted, the availability of resources for peacebuilding has a significant impact on the successful resolution of a violent conflict. Yet, the large flows of unfathomable aid are said to re-create the environment in which the civil war in the 1990s erupted and evolved (Goodhand and Sedra, 2007). Afghanistan is also a challenging case for the study and application of peace conditionalities, as the Bonn Agreement itself only legitimised a victors peace, leaving the Taliban quite potent. Secondly, the dual disposition of the process should be emphasised building peace in a climate of ongoing war. The approach adopted by the Alliance forces, to create a security force whilst at the same time failing to provide an institution that is to be responsible for its management is yet another(prenominal) formula of the prioritisation of short-term goals over peace-making and state-building in the longer term (Sedra, 2005). Although reconstruction has been a top priority and used as a political platform during the first parliamen tary elections (Wilder, 2005), the international spending has emphasised security over reconstruction (Rubin, Hamidzada and Stoddard, 2003). The long-standing conflict itself has resulted in the development of a war economy (Felbab-Brown, 2005 Fielden and Goodhand, 2001) in which it is difficult for the emerging democratic state to claim monopoly over violence. Facing considerable historical and institutional constraints, the UN Assistance mission in Afghanistan, a part of which is ISAF, has found it difficult to implement its driven democratisation mandate (Tadjbakhsh and Schoiswohl, 2008 Saikal, 2012). In conclusion, despite ISAF has achieved some successes in the training of Afghanistans security forces and improving security (Beljan, 2013), it is difficult to claim to the mandate and goals which were set as its main tasks have been achieved. Over the period of reconstruction the country has been relying on foreign aid for the maintenance of its structures, it is lull a fragile state on the brink of re-emerging conflict, as there is still a lack of a clear political settlement among the dissimilar interest parties in the country.BibliographyAyub, F. and Kuovo, S. (2008). Righting the courseHumanitarian intervention, the war on terror and the future of Afghanistan. internationalistic Affairs, 84(4), 641-657.Beljan, R. (2013). 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